Paul Gölz
Definitively resolves a named open problem in fair division with airtight dual certification, but as a narrow single-instance impossibility with limited downstream extensibility.
This note gives an instance demonstrating that the pairwise maximin share (PMMS) property cannot be satisfied by any allocation in certain fair division problems with indivisible goods and additive valuations. The instance requires only agents and goods, and is accompanied by a proof that no PMMS allocation exists. A separate instance shows (certified by exhaustive enumeration with a computer) that PMMS cannot be approximated within a ratio above .
Core Contribution. This note resolves a well-defined open problem in fair division: whether pairwise maximin share (PMMS) allocations always exist for indivisible goods under additive valuations. The answer is negative. The paper exhibits a concrete counterexample with only n=3 agents and m=9 goods, provides a hand-checkable proof of nonexistence, and separately establishes an approximation barrier showing that α-PMMS cannot be guaranteed for α > 78/79 ≈ 0.987. The existence question was prominent — listed as Open Problem 8 in the Amanatidis et al. (2023) survey and among 24 questions in the econcs-bench collection — and PMMS is of special interest because (under positive values) it is stronger than EFX, "arguably the largest open question in fair division." The result is sharp in a meaningful sense: PMMS is known to exist for m ≤ n+2, coincides with MMS for n=2 (solvable by cut-and-choose), so n=3 is the minimal agent count for such an impossibility.
Methodological Rigor. This is a strong point. The nonexistence claim is backed two ways: a carefully structured human-readable proof (Theorem 1, Lemmas 1–2) that uses high-level arguments — every agent gets exactly one large good and at least one small good — to prune the case analysis, and an independent exhaustive computer enumeration over all 3⁹ ≈ 20,000 allocations using exact fractional arithmetic (avoiding floating-point pitfalls). The code is included and publicly posted. The dual certification (analytic + computational, exact) makes the central claim essentially incontrovertible. The approximation bound is likewise computationally certified.
Potential Impact. The result definitively redirects a strand of research: the community can stop seeking PMMS existence proofs for additive valuations and instead focus on approximation guarantees (the best known is ≈0.781-PMMS) or relaxations such as epistemic PMMS (which the author notes *does* exist for 3 additive agents). This is genuine knowledge that changes what problems are worth pursuing. That said, impossibility results built around a single opaque instance have inherently limited extensibility — the author candidly concedes "the chances of people building on the proof of nonexistence for a concrete counterexample instance seem quite limited," and that the instance remains "mostly opaque" despite the clean write-up. The most enduring citations will likely be to the *fact* rather than the technique.
A notable secondary contribution is the transparent documentation that the counterexample was found "largely autonomously" by an LLM (GPT-6 Astra / ChatGPT), with the human role being simplification, verification, and exposition. As one of the earliest documented cases of an LLM resolving a research-level open problem in combinatorial mathematics, this meta-narrative may draw citations from the rapidly growing "AI-for-mathematics" community beyond fair division proper.
Timeliness & Relevance. Highly timely on two axes. The existence question was recently and explicitly flagged as open in surveys and benchmarks, and a concurrent paper (Byrka et al. 2026) settled the easier monotone-valuation case — this note closes the harder additive case. The AI-discovery angle is also of the moment.
Other observations. The comparison to MMS is intriguing: the first MMS counterexample was also n=3, m=12 (later reduced to n=3, m=9), mirroring the trajectory here, and the author speculates about a deeper connection — an open direction that could seed follow-up. The contrast with EFX (exists for 3 agents) and epistemic PMMS (exists for 3 additive agents) sharpens the theoretical landscape and is itself a useful conceptual takeaway.
Overall, this is a rigorous, cleanly executed, and definitive resolution of a recognized open problem — high-value and reliable, but bounded in downstream extensibility by its nature as a single-instance impossibility. Its impact is amplified modestly by timeliness and the AI-discovery meta-story.
Generated Sep 9, 2026
Definitively resolves a named open problem in fair division with airtight dual certification, but as a narrow single-instance impossibility with limited downstream extensibility.