Zheng Lin, Zhenxing Niu, Haoxuan Ji, Yuzhe Huang, Haichang Gao
Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in solving complex problems by generating structured, step-by-step reasoning content. However, exposing a model's internal reasoning process introduces additional safety risks; for example, recent studies show that LRMs are more vulnerable to jailbreak attacks than standard LLMs. In this paper, we investigate jailbreak attacks on LRMs and reveal that the attack success rate (ASR) is closely correlated with LRMs' attention patterns. Specifically, successful jailbreaks tend to assign lower attention to harmful tokens in the input prompt, while allocating higher attention to those tokens in the reasoning content. Motivated by this finding, we propose a novel jailbreak method for LRMs that leverages reinforcement learning (RL) to enhance attack effectiveness, explicitly incorporating attention signals into the reward function design. In addition, we introduce diverse persuasion strategies to enrich the RL action space, which consistently improves the ASR. Extensive experiments on five open-source and closed-source LRMs across three benchmarks demonstrate that our method achieves substantially higher ASR, outperforming existing approaches in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, and transferability.
This paper identifies a novel empirical observation about attention patterns in Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) during jailbreak attacks: successful jailbreaks correlate with *lower* attention to harmful tokens in the input prompt but *higher* attention to harmful tokens in the chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning content. Building on this observation, the authors propose AGR (Attention-Guided Reward), an RL-based jailbreak framework that uses the signed distance to a linear SVM decision boundary in (AP_p, AP_r) space as a reward signal, guiding prompt refinement toward attention patterns associated with successful attacks. The method also introduces a 17-action space incorporating cognitive persuasion strategies to diversify prompt mutations.
The core insight—that the attention allocation discrepancy between prompt and reasoning content discriminates successful from failed jailbreaks—is genuinely interesting and specific to LRMs. This distinguishes the work from prior methods that simply apply LLM-oriented jailbreak techniques to reasoning models.
This paper provides a highly effective automated jailbreak tool. The 96-98% ASR on open-source models and 64-71% on closed-source models, combined with an average attack time of ~10 seconds, represents a potent offensive capability. The persuasion-strategy-based action space essentially automates social engineering of AI systems. While red-teaming research is valuable, the completeness of the attack pipeline (code, prompt templates, and detailed methodology) raises responsible disclosure questions.
The work could influence: (1) LRM safety alignment research by highlighting the prompt-vs-reasoning attention asymmetry; (2) defense mechanisms specifically targeting attention manipulation; (3) future RL-based red-teaming frameworks.
The paper is highly timely. LRMs (DeepSeek-R1, Qwen3, o4-mini, Gemini 2.5) are rapidly being deployed, and their safety properties are less understood than those of standard LLMs. The observation that exposed reasoning traces create additional attack surfaces is increasingly relevant as more models adopt CoT generation. The paper directly addresses the gap between LLM jailbreak research and the emerging LRM paradigm.
Missing comparisons: Mousetrap [30] is discussed in related work but not included in baselines. The paper also does not compare against other RL-based jailbreak methods for LLMs.
This is a solid, timely contribution that combines an interesting empirical observation with a well-engineered RL framework. The attention-pattern finding is the paper's most valuable contribution and could influence both offensive and defensive research on LRM safety. The experimental results are strong and comprehensive. However, the small sample foundation for the core observation, the lack of causal analysis, and the inherent dual-use concerns somewhat temper the impact. The work represents a meaningful advance in understanding and exploiting LRM vulnerabilities, though the mechanistic understanding remains surface-level.
Generated May 20, 2026
Paper 2 addresses critical safety vulnerabilities in the rapidly emerging field of Large Reasoning Models. Its findings linking attention patterns to jailbreak success offer broad, highly timely implications for AI safety, security, and alignment across all domains. While Paper 1 is innovative and solves a crucial data-leakage problem, its primary impact is confined to the more specialized niche of financial backtesting and temporal evaluation.
Paper 1 offers higher potential scientific impact due to its extreme timeliness and relevance to AI safety. As Large Reasoning Models are rapidly deployed, understanding their unique vulnerabilities is critical. Identifying the correlation between attention patterns and jailbreak success, and exploiting it via RL, is a highly novel approach with broad real-world implications for AI security. While Paper 2 presents a rigorous method for Knowledge Graph querying, its impact is largely confined to a specialized subfield, whereas Paper 1 addresses an urgent challenge affecting the broader and rapidly growing generative AI landscape.
Paper 1 addresses a critical bottleneck in AI: the misalignment between traditional NLP benchmarks and real-world knowledge work. By proposing a comprehensive evaluation framework based on occupational studies, it has the potential to fundamentally shift how AI agents are tested across diverse industries. While Paper 2 offers a timely security contribution, Paper 1's foundational approach to evaluation provides broader methodological impact and wider real-world applicability across all sectors integrating AI workflows.
Paper 1 addresses the critical and timely topic of AI safety for Large Reasoning Models, which are rapidly being deployed. The discovery that attention patterns correlate with jailbreak success is novel and provides mechanistic insight. The RL-based attack method with attention-guided rewards is innovative and has broad implications for AI safety research. Given the explosive growth of LLM/LRM deployment, this work has high relevance and urgency. Paper 2, while solid, addresses a more established optimization domain (VRP) with incremental improvements over existing methods, limiting its broader impact.
Paper 1 likely has higher scientific impact: it introduces a practical framework to distill LLM agent interaction traces into reusable, efficient RPA code, addressing a clear deployment bottleneck (cost/latency) and enabling broad real-world automation across enterprise and consumer GUI workflows. The translator–builder pipeline plus hybrid repair strategy suggests methodological completeness, and the large token/runtime reductions indicate immediate utility. Paper 2 is novel and timely in LRM security, but as an offensive jailbreak method its broader adoption and positive downstream impact may be constrained; its contributions may be more specialized to safety research.
Paper 2 addresses a timely and critical safety concern with Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), a rapidly emerging area. Its novel insight connecting attention patterns to jailbreak vulnerability, combined with an RL-based attack framework, has broader impact across AI safety, alignment research, and policy. The findings affect both open-source and closed-source models, increasing practical relevance. Paper 1, while methodologically sound in extending unlearning to multi-task settings, addresses a more incremental and narrower problem. The AI safety implications and timeliness of Paper 2 give it higher potential impact across the research community.
Paper 2 addresses a highly critical and timely issue—the safety vulnerabilities of Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) to jailbreak attacks. Its novel use of attention patterns combined with reinforcement learning to expose and exploit these vulnerabilities provides significant contributions to the rapidly growing field of AI safety and red-teaming. While Paper 1 offers valuable advancements in neurosymbolic claim verification, the immediate security implications, broader interest in LRM safety, and extensive experimental validation in Paper 2 give it a higher potential for broad scientific and practical impact.
Paper 1 likely has higher broad scientific impact: it introduces a large, multilingual benchmark (10,372 pairs) and a multi-metric evaluation framework for programmatic spatiotemporal reasoning, uncovering a general “execution–spatial” failure mode relevant to code generation, vision-language, and evaluation research. Its outputs are readily reusable by the community and can standardize comparisons across models. Paper 2 is novel and timely for AI safety, but jailbreak methods are narrower in positive scientific utility and can face dissemination/ethical constraints, limiting adoption and cross-field impact despite methodological sophistication.
Paper 2 likely has higher scientific impact due to strong real-world applicability (manufacturing/CAD automation), broad relevance across AI, robotics/agents, geometry, and design tools, and a constructive methodology (toolchain + verification + memory + RL) that can generalize to other long-horizon, constraint-heavy generation tasks. It targets a timely, high-value industrial bottleneck and proposes an architecture enabling self-correction without large new annotations. Paper 1 is novel but primarily advances offensive jailbreak capabilities, which may limit adoption and downstream impact despite security relevance.
Paper 1 addresses the urgent and highly relevant issue of safety and vulnerabilities in emerging Large Reasoning Models (LRMs). Given the rapid deployment of reasoning LLMs, understanding and mitigating their jailbreak vulnerabilities is critical. The novel use of attention-guided reinforcement learning provides a rigorous approach to AI safety, likely leading to broader immediate impact and real-world application in securing foundational models compared to the more mature field of vision model explainability addressed in Paper 2.